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In this report, we characterize the key themes of transformation and tie them together 
in a “how to” guide. The perspectives were synthesized from strategic management 
literature, case studies, and from interviews with key management personnel from 
private industry on their transformation experiences. 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
CONTENTS 
 
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................................ 7 
1. Establishing Transformation Leadership .................................................................................... 9 
2.  Understanding the Crisis.......................................................................................................... 11 
3. Developing a Vision and Plans to Address the Crisis............................................................... 13 
3.1 Developing the Vision ...................................................................................................... 13 
3.2 Keeping the Vision Relevant ............................................................................................ 14 
4. Execution – Transforming the Organization............................................................................. 15 
4.1 Transformation Kick Off .................................................................................................. 15 
4.2 Imparting a Sense of Urgency........................................................................................... 15 
4.3 Articulating and Communicating the Vision Statement ................................................... 15 
4.4 Elements of Implementation ............................................................................................. 16 
4.4.1 Customer Focus................................................................................................... 16 
4.4.2 Productivity Improvement................................................................................... 17 
4.4.3 Internal Processes ................................................................................................ 17 
4.4.4 Culture Change.................................................................................................... 18 
4.4.5 Organizational Design......................................................................................... 18 
4.4.6 Short-Term Wins and Intermediate Phases ......................................................... 19 
4.4.7 Vetting the Plan ................................................................................................... 19 
4.4.8 Consensus and Obstacles..................................................................................... 20 
4.4.9 Missteps............................................................................................................... 20 
5. Metrics – What gets measured gets done.................................................................................. 21 
6. Conclusion – A Caution and a Challenge ................................................................................. 23 
References..................................................................................................................................... 25 
Appendix A:  Strategic Planning Using the Strategy Map ........................................................... 27 
Distribution ................................................................................................................................... 31 
 
 
FIGURES 
Figure 1  Example Strategy Map for the Power Generating Equipment Company...................... 29 
  
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7 
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Over the past couple of decades, many organizations have found themselves in crises 
necessitating that they quickly and fundamentally change. The experiences of organizations that 
have weathered the storm of transformation (i.e., rapid and fundamental change) have much to 
teach those who may face similar challenges in the future. Our effort was motivated by the desire 
to arm Sandia National Laboratories and Nuclear Weapons Complex leadership with a 
compendium of industry lessons learned to position them to face the challenges of 
transformation. 
We found no single resource that wove all of the diverse transformation-related topics (strategic 
and tactical planning, metrics, leadership, corporate culture, etc.) into a comprehensive 
“transformation guide.” Although there are numerous illuminating references on a variety of 
transformation topics, none covered them all.   
Our goal in this study was to characterize the key themes of transformation and tie them together 
in a “how to” guide. To this end, we studied a variety of books and articles, we analyzed case 
studies, and we interviewed key management personnel from private industry on their 
transformation experiences.  
There are those who question whether lessons learned from commercial industry would be 
applicable to the Nuclear Weapons Complex. We found that there is commonality between the 
NWC and commercial industry in the majority of key transformation topics. Specifically, the 
NWC has customers who have expectations and influence funding. The NWC has products, 
organizational structure, leaders and personnel. Thus, we concluded that there are beneficial 
lessons that the NWC could learn from commercial industry. 
In the course of our study, we relied upon a diverse set of information resources. Yet, we found 
that, despite this diversity, a consistent transformation thesis was apparent. The transformation 
thesis that emerged can be broadly stated as follows: 
For organizations facing a significant crisis, successful transformations can be characterized 
by an effective leader and a supporting coalition: 
• convincing their organization that success depends on changing the way it does business,  
• conceiving a new organizational paradigm to bring about this change, 
• leading the organization down the path to the new paradigm, 
• and utilizing metrics to guide the necessary change. 
This transformation thesis is built upon five key transformation themes: Leadership, urgency, 
vision of a transformed organization, execution, and guiding metrics.  
Leadership – Without effective leadership, the other transformation elements will fail. 
Transformation leaders must be communicators who command respect and organizational 
resources and have the stamina to overcome resistance to change. Nevertheless, even a capable 
leader at the helm cannot single-handedly transform an organization – transformation also 
requires a strong guiding coalition. The guiding coalition is the transformation leader’s power 
base and should include diverse representatives from key groups within the organization and 
even external stakeholders.  
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Urgency – Transformation is most effectively driven by a prevailing organizational sense of 
“change or die!” Change is difficult and threatening to any organization, with people tending to 
avoid it unless it is absolutely necessary. For an organization to be motivated to transform, its 
personnel must be convinced that the difficulties of change are, by far, preferable to the status 
quo.  
Vision – The organization must have a clear vision of what changes it has to make to deal with 
its crisis. Herein, we define this vision to be a target state the organization must reach to address 
its crisis, and the strategic plans that will take the organization to this target state. We stress that 
organizational adaptability must be an element in this envisioned end state. 
Execution – Once the organization has developed a vision of what it must do to address its crisis, 
it faces the hard part of transformation – execution. Execution marks the transition from planning 
to action wherein the divergence between the vision and reality become apparent. 
Guiding metrics – Metrics are critical in guiding the aforementioned transformation activities 
from crisis characterization, through planning the vision, and ultimately to execution.  
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1. ESTABLISHING TRANSFORMATION LEADERSHIP 
Without effective leadership, the other transformation elements will fail. Lockheed Martin 
Aeronautics Company VP, William Kessler, stresses that the absolute, unwavering, and 
sustained commitment of the enterprise leader to communicating, leading, and supporting 
transformation is required for successful large-scale transformation.1 Thomas Kiely writes in the 
Harvard Business Review that, based on the experiences of more than 50 management 
consultants, having the wrong person lead the transformation was a major contributor to 
transformation failure.2 In a review of more than 10 years of private equity firm* transactions, it 
was found that the key to successful transformation was managerial discipline.3  
Organizations must never delegate transformation leadership to external consultants. Kiely notes 
that delegating transformation responsibility is an abrogation of leadership responsibility that 
typically leads to failure.4 During transformation, executives must make hard decisions, and 
those who are eager to delegate this task are often unwilling to transform their personal 
management styles and priorities. Furthermore, in delegating transformation responsibility, 
company leadership is, in essence, saying that the effort is not important enough to merit their 
full attention.  
Transformation leaders must be communicators who command respect and organizational 
resources and have the stamina to overcome resistance to change. Transformation leaders will 
face a host of challenges ranging from motivating the troops, to making tough choices, to 
changing the status quo and its associated vested interests that no longer serve the organization. 
Ideally, the transformation leader will be the highest ranking person in the organizational unit 
that is transforming. Kiely contends that, to be effective, the leader must have attained high 
management rank, must have demonstrated exceptional leadership skills, and must be “in it for 
the long haul” (i.e., not facing an imminent job change or retirement).5 Former Siemens CEO, 
Heinrich Von Pierer, emphasizes that he was selected because Siemens needed leadership that 
was able to see the big picture and communicate effectively, both internally and externally.6 Von 
Pierer describes his predecessors as introverted and arrogant and credits such things as his 
service on the local city council and membership in the labor union with broadening his 
perspective. 
Even a capable leader at the helm cannot single-handedly transform an organization – 
transformation also requires a strong guiding coalition. John Kotter, of the Harvard Business 
School, examined transformations of more than 100 businesses and found that successful 
transformations included effective guiding coalitions that supported the transformation leader.7 
In the conceptual stages of transformation, a small coalition of select heads of the organization 
develops the vision for transformation. These key leaders must then grow their coalition to as 
many as a few dozen champions who share their transformation vision. Not surprisingly, 
coalition forming can be particularly difficult in companies that historically have not encouraged 
teamwork. 
                                                 
* Private equity (PE) firms buy weak or failing companies and transform them to enhance their performance with the 
intent of reselling them within a few years for a significant profit. The term “private” denotes that these firms are not 
publicly owned. 
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The heart of the organization lies in its line functions. Therefore, line management must be the 
driving force behind transformation. Former IBM executive, Randy Isaac, tells how IBM 
assembled a group of transformation managers who did not hold line roles, thereby externalizing 
transformation from the organization’s key business areas. Isaac stresses that, to be effective, line 
management must play a key role in transformation.8 Thus, the guiding coalition must be 
comprised largely of line representation. 
Diverse representation in the guiding coalition provides a more effective power base. While line 
management must form its core, the coalition might also include union leaders and key players 
from customer and supplier organizations. Furthermore, personnel from non-line functions such 
as human resources, information technology, and budgeting also provide valuable insights (and 
any of these groups could become opponents if they are excluded).9, 10 Given their diverse 
backgrounds, attention must be paid to developing a sense of trust and communication between 
coalition members. 
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2.  UNDERSTANDING THE CRISIS 
Organizations must understand specifically what factors are causing their crisis. Shortly, we will 
see that convincing the organization of the urgency of the crisis is a key step in the execution 
phase. As leaders face the challenge of imparting urgency, it is not enough that they 
acknowledge an existing (or impending crisis), they must objectively explain the confluence of 
drivers that led to the crisis. Furthermore, the organization must also use metrics to baseline its 
initial state to enable it to measure its progress as transformation unfolds. At the end of this 
phase, the transformation leadership must have an objective characterization of what drivers led 
to the crisis. 
Organizational crises are typically caused by both external drivers (those that the organization 
cannot control directly) and internal drivers (those under direct organizational influence). 
Examples of external drivers include decreasing demand for the organization’s products, 
increasing customer expectations for quality, timeliness, and cost, or the rise of a strong 
competitor. Internal drivers include an organization losing touch with its customers, loss of key 
personnel, and rewards and incentives that are inconsistent with organizational goals. Internal 
crisis drivers are often difficult for organizations to acknowledge. For example, Siemens’ 
management attributed their decreasing revenues to an external driver –  globalization-induced 
price drops. Von Pierer notes that, in so doing, Siemens’ management was ignoring a key 
internal driver – Siemens’ products were not innovative enough to compete with lower cost 
foreign products. 
Metrics can be used to bring crisis drivers into focus and to baseline the organization’s state at 
the outset of transformation. For example, Pall has identified the following metrics that are 
geared toward assessing the value of an organization’s business-areas.11  
External Drivers 
• Customer impact reflects the customer’s perception of the value of the organization’s 
products (or services) in terms of cost, schedule, quality, performance, and service. 
• Worth measures how much revenue a business-area brings into the organization. 
Internal Drivers 
• Relevance is the degree to which a business-area differentiates the organization from its 
competitors.  
• Viability is a measure of business-area sustainability and is proportional to stakeholder 
commitment and competence of the business-area leaders, and is inversely proportional 
to business-area breadth, resource demands, and technological risk.  
Although some of Pall’s metrics are qualitative, they provide both a degree of objectivity and a 
consistent yardstick by which to measure key organizational aspects.  
Objective metrics notwithstanding, an organization can accurately characterize its crisis drivers 
only if it is willing to look frankly at its strengths and weaknesses. Absent frank assessment of 
organizational shortcomings, transformation will fail. Organizational special interests often 
militate against critical review as they fear the possible ramifications. Honest assessment also 
requires trust between stakeholders. William Rouse describes how critical assessment of 
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government agencies can be abused to justify budget reductions.12 Therefore, government 
agencies are often very wary of critical review. The unfortunate consequence of abusing critical 
assessments is that it stifles honest assessment aimed at identifying and addressing organizational 
weakness. William Powers, former Ford Motor Company VP for research, cites the PM/EI 
approach (participation management / employee involvement) used at Ford as a useful 
mechanism for employees to bring up suggestions.13 In the PM/EI approach, employees provide 
suggestions to their management, who must either accept the recommendations or explain why 
they were rejected. 
Inability of organizations to adapt can also be a crisis driver. Often, organizations find 
themselves in a crisis simply because practices that served them well in the past are no longer 
effective. So, while the organizational crisis might manifest itself in symptoms that can be 
described by Pall’s metrics, the underlying illness is the inability to adapt.  
Finally, organizations need not wait until they are engulfed in a crisis to begin instilling a sense 
of urgency in their employees. Former Lockheed Martin CEO Norm Augustine stresses that 
leaders must attempt to “read the tea leaves” and provide early warning of impending crises.14 At 
Allied Signal, people were motivated to change by the decline of former powerhouses such as 
IBM and Kodak, realizing that they could be next.15 Goodyear’s Chief Technical Officer, Joe 
Gingo, echoes this sentiment but cautions that organizational complacency impedes crisis 
anticipation. Goodyear was able to anticipate two of the four crises that it faced over the past 
three decades. Nevertheless, while some at Goodyear were sounding the warning, many key 
players were initially not listening.16 
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3. DEVELOPING A VISION AND PLANS TO ADDRESS THE CRISIS 
The organization must have a clear vision of what changes it must make to deal with its crisis. 
Herein, we define vision to be a target state that the organization must reach to address its crisis, 
and the strategic plans that will take the organization to this target state. The vision will serve as 
the guide for planning, decision-making, and trade-offs during the often-blurry execution phase 
of organizational change. At the end of this phase, the transformation leadership should have an 
objective characterization of what drivers led to the crisis and a clear vision to address the crisis. 
3.1 Developing the Vision 
The organization’s vision cannot be a mere collection of slogans. The vision must be based on 
the understanding of the crisis and the organization’s current state. Furthermore, the vision must 
be supported by a strategic plan that focuses organizational objectives on addressing the crisis. 
Since inability to adapt underlies many organizational crises, adaptability will often be part of 
the organization’s future state. 
Strategic planning should yield plans and associated metrics to guide the organization toward 
attaining its vision. We found that the Strategy Map, discussed in Appendix A, provides an 
example of a systematic strategic planning approach that links organizational activities to desired 
outcomes. The Strategy Map provides a host of metrics from growth and productivity measures, 
to customer satisfaction levels and staffing and capability targets. Nevertheless, organizations 
can use whatever strategic planning approach best serves their needs.   
An effective strategy ensures that transformation efforts are targeted at key business-areas. 
Operational improvements sprinkled across an organization might yield lower costs and greater 
efficiency. Nevertheless, if the improvements are not directed at the organization’s key business-
areas, they will have no significant impact on the organizational crisis.17, 18   
Once a strategy is developed, the organization can estimate the costs and benefits of its planned 
actions. Clearly, the benefits of individual transformation efforts must exceed the expected cost. 
Yet, in the face of prohibitive costs, an acceptable cost-benefit balance can be reached by scaling 
back the scope of transformation. Kiely wrote on a study of the relationship between the 
ambition of a transformation vision and the ultimate outcomes, and noted that for transformation 
to beneficial, either the depth or the breadth of transformation had to be radical, but not 
necessarily both.19 For example, some organizations implemented radical changes, but only in a 
few locations or only to select processes (i.e., pilot programs). Conversely, some organizations 
implemented relatively modest process improvements, but did so across the whole corporation. 
Both approaches yielded modest improvements and could always be built upon in the future as 
resources became available. 
Rouse cautions that, if the explicit or implicit goal of strategic planning is to maintain the status 
quo, then the effort is not truly transformation. Such an effort will, at best, yield only small 
improvements. Rouse identifies the following hallmarks of so-called strategic planning that is, in 
fact, only an exercise in maintaining the status quo: 
• The planning is an exercise in justifying what the organization is already doing. 
• Considerable effort is expended in ensuring that current efforts are all central to potential 
new directions. 
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• New goals look very similar to old goals. 
Since transformation will involve preserving some elements of the status quo and discarding 
others, to prevent confusion, leadership should explicitly state what will stay and what will go. 
That said, while Rouse contends that, as difficult as it is to start new initiatives, killing old ones 
is even more so. Powers suggests that organizations have a formal “kill” process.† In an 
environment of flat or declining budgets, there can be no new growth unless some efforts are 
scaled back or terminated.  
3.2 Keeping the Vision Relevant 
The vision will probably need to be revised in light of the realities of execution. Rouse warns 
that once progress is made in executing strategies, disconnects between the vision and reality 
will become apparent. At this point, the vision should be refined to ensure it is consistent with 
newfound constraints and opportunities. For example, activities or approaches that were planned 
in the initial strategy may prove more costly than anticipated, or may not yield the expected 
benefits. As such, the strategy must be changed, and such changes and their underlying rationale 
should be thoroughly communicated within the organization. This approach is but one 
manifestation of the adaptability toward which organizations should strive. 
Organizations should have consistent near-, medium-, and long-term plans. Powers suggests that 
organizations develop a detailed plan covering the following year’s activities, milestones, and 
associated budgeting. Organizations should also have rough, visionary 10-year plans that attempt 
to keep the organization aligned with the dynamic external business environment. Intermediate 
5-year plans bridge the gap and ensure that near-term activities are consistent with the long term 
vision. 
                                                 
† For example, Ford Motor Co. had an annual review process wherein managers would come armed with plans 
outlining what 20 percent of their program area they were willing to cut. The intent was to regularly replace 
unproductive efforts with new, more promising ones.  
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4. EXECUTION – TRANSFORMING THE ORGANIZATION 
Once the organization has developed a vision of what it must do to address its crisis, it faces the 
hard part of transformation – execution. Execution marks the transition from the planning phase 
to the action phase. It is during execution that plans often run into organizational opposition and 
that cultural challenges surface.  
During execution, the mix of players driving transformation shifts. Often the types of people 
involved in the strategic phase of transformation planning are not those best suited to the tactical 
nature of execution. Thus, the guiding coalition must identify tactically-minded people who will 
carry much of the burden of execution. Nevertheless, even though their role is less central, the 
guidance of the strategic planners remains vital as they ensure that the execution does not stray 
from the strategic path. 
4.1 Transformation Kick Off 
At this time, the leadership should have both a clearly-defined characterization of what drivers 
led to the crisis and a clear vision of how to address the crisis. Now, the guiding coalition is 
ready to present its case to the larger organization and kick off the transformation. Kick-off 
efforts should be aimed at ensuring that personnel throughout the organization fully understand 
both the crisis and the plan to deal with it. This approach was employed by Lockheed Martin 
Aeronautics in their recent transformation.20 
4.2 Imparting a Sense of Urgency 
Transformation is most effectively driven by a prevailing sense of “change or die!” Change is 
difficult and threatening to any organization, with people tending to avoid change unless it is 
absolutely necessary. Kotter notes that roughly half of transformation efforts failed because the 
leadership did not establish a sufficient sense of urgency, adding that the sense of urgency is high 
enough only when at least three-quarters of the company’s management believes that the current 
state is totally unacceptable. Goodyear’s Gingo, used the term “threat” instead of “urgency,” and 
believes that an external threat is the most important element of change.21 Highlighting that all 
Goodyear transformations occurred as a result of an external threat, Gingo explained that, 
without a threat, there is no urgency and people remain complacent. Similarly, Allied Signal’s 
Bossidy firmly believes in the need for a “burning platform” to motivate change.22  
4.3 Articulating and Communicating the Vision Statement 
Once a vision has been developed, it must be clearly articulated in a vision statement that can be 
understood by the organization. The vision statement describes the target state and its underlying 
rationale, and must be supported by the strategic plan. Kotter identifies a clear and compelling 
vision statement as key to transformation success. The vision statement must be easily 
communicated and understood, compelling, and provide focus for transformation efforts. Kotter 
sums up with the following rule of thumb: “If you can’t communicate the vision statement to 
someone in five minutes or less and get a reaction that signifies both understanding and interest, 
you are not yet done with this phase of the transformation process.” 
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Even if a compelling vision statement is developed, it will have no impact if it is not effectively 
communicated. Kotter notes that most transformation visions are under-communicated and 
contends that even extensive management speeches and newsletters will not sufficiently convey 
the vision. To be communicated effectively, the vision must be woven not only into corporate 
communications, but also into the daily corporate business of programmatic goals, performance 
reviews, etc. IBM’s Isaac echoes this view, noting that, in what he admits borders on “maniacal 
focus,” leadership must continually communicate in every possible medium the transformation 
message.23 Von Pierer favors frequent, small “town hall” meetings as an avenue to communicate, 
encourage, engage, and to reiterate the urgency. Most importantly, the vision must be 
communicated through the exemplary behavior of leadership personnel who consciously attempt 
to become “living symbols” of the new corporation. 
Leadership must link crisis urgency to hope provided by the vision. Researchers have observed 
that a crisis environment can create fear and panic, which, by themselves, drive out the optimism 
necessary for successful transformation.24 To combat this, as leadership beats the drum of crisis, 
it must also highlight its vision as the means for tackling the crisis. Goodyear’s Gingo points out 
that once a leader has convinced people that there is a threat, and that he/she has a clear vision 
for combating it, the organization will eagerly follow the course the leader charts.25 
4.4 Elements of Implementation 
It will fall to the organization to determine how the strategy will be implemented. The strategy 
describes what must be done to address the crisis. We have discussed tools such as the Strategy 
Map to develop strategies. Nevertheless, the specifics of implementation and associated tools are 
scant in the literature. For example, transformation typically must occur while an organization 
continues to meet its ongoing obligations – that is, the organization must “transform in place.” 
Lockheed Martin’s Augustine uses the law of wing-walking, “never let go of something until 
you have hold of something else,” as he suggests phasing in the new while phasing out the old to 
allow transformation in place.26 The colorful metaphor notwithstanding, we found no concrete 
examples of how organizations accomplished this.  
The number of ongoing transformation efforts should be limited. Powers suggests that planners 
pick key elements to implement first, and wait until they take hold before moving on.27 A 
barrage of too many efforts risks creating a “flavor of the month” perception within the 
organization. 
4.4.1 Customer Focus 
Despite the availability of metrics to characterize the customers’ perspectives, absent a culture of 
customer focus, organizations will find that meeting customer expectations is a continual 
struggle. We have already discussed the importance of the customer perspective in characterizing 
the crisis and planning strategies. Yet, while customer focus appears to be an obvious concept, 
experience shows that organizations often lose sight of what the customers value and instead 
focus on their own priorities. For example Siemens engineers were notorious for insisting that 
their products would be “better” if they included sophisticated features that the customers in fact 
did not want.28 Similarly, in the face of customer polls indicating an order-fill rate of only 60 
percent – far lower than internal performance measurements indicating 98 percent – Allied 
Signal personnel attempted to demonstrate why the customers were wrong instead of working to 
address the problem.29  
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Organizations can quickly find themselves in a situation wherein their products and practices are 
no longer in tune with customer needs. Yet, because these products and practices have become 
central to the organization’s culture, they continue to be valued within the organization despite 
the fact they have become irrelevant. IBM had an internationally recognized R&D capability that 
was central to its culture and image. Yet, IBM R&D, which included groundbreaking work in 
areas such as neutrino detection, was fast becoming irrelevant to the increasingly software- and 
service-centric demands of IBM’s customers. 
A culture of customer focus stems naturally from close customer interactions. Allied Signal’s 
Lawrence Bossidy contends “the closer you come to the customers, the more you appreciate the 
need to change. And the more inwardly focused you are, the less you understand that need.  As 
we get more and more customer focused, we don't have to preach about the need to change. 
People know it.”30  
4.4.2 Productivity Improvement 
Productivity improvement is often a critical part of transformation. Organizations can choose 
from several proven productivity improvement methodologies. “Lean” techniques reduce 
inefficiencies and waste. Six Sigma is a statistical methodology for reducing process variations 
and mistakes. TQM (Total Quality Management) is a methodology that is similar to Lean. 
Michael Hammer, who introduced reengineering, uses the term “process” to describe an 
integrated series of operations that lead to a customer-value-based end goal. Hammer’s premise 
is that efficiencies are realized when organizations are structured and managed according to 
processes instead of according to functions (i.e., stove-pipes).‡ Hammer’s approach is not 
unique, sharing many features of Jones’s and Womack’s Lean concepts.31 While tactical in 
nature, these tools can have profound effects not only on an organization’s productivity, but on 
its whole culture.  
4.4.3 Internal Processes 
Internal processes must support transformation goals. Existing policies or business practices can 
be inconsistent with the transformation vision, and might even inhibit new goals. As such, in 
transformation, organizations must guard against the tendency to automatically retain existing 
processes, and should instead reevaluate processes in the light of the newly-articulated 
transformation goals.  
Business-areas within an organization might even work at crossed purposes. Cascella provides 
such an example for a bottle making company.32 The bottle forming department made the bottles 
and transferred them to the selection department, which culled out bottles they deemed to be 
defective. The bottles were then shipped to the customer. The forming department was rewarded 
on the basis of maximizing the number of bottles shipped. The selection department was 
rewarded on the basis of minimizing the fraction of bottles rejected by the customer. These 
incentives worked against one another, driving the forming department to neglect quality in favor 
of volume delivered, while driving the selection department to do just the opposite. Alignment of 
internal processes led to shared quality responsibility and essentially rewarded both departments 
on the basis of the number of bottles accepted. 
                                                 
‡ Functionally-based organizations tend to be divided into stovepipes (e.g., marketing, design, manufacturing) 
wherein functional elements support organizational product lines. 
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4.4.4 Culture Change 
Transformation will never take hold until it becomes part of the new organizational culture, 
leading IBM’s Isaac to highlight culture change as the key element of transformation.33 We have 
already discussed a culture of customer focus, but culture can also drive performance standards, 
corporate frankness, and technical focus. Nevertheless, Powers points out that, because culture 
cannot be readily measured, it cannot be changed directly. Instead culture is an outcome of 
organizational practices. For example, Kotter notes that culture change can be advanced through 
careful hiring, promotion, and personnel development to ensure that the next generation of 
corporate leaders truly embodies the transformation vision. Culture can also be changed through 
reward systems. 
Allied Signal was able to overcome a culture of circumspection, tolerating mediocrity, prima 
donna employees, and poor cost and schedule performance during its successful transformation 
in the early 1990s. Former CEO Bossidy sought to increase employee support for the 
organization by fostering an environment in which employees spoke up, believing that people in 
the trenches are typically aware of issues and want to discuss them frankly.34 It was internally 
perceived that mediocrity was tolerated, and poor performers were often just shuffled around the 
organization. Bossidy ensured that mediocre personnel were eliminated quickly. Similarly, 
employees complained that “lone rangers” were rewarded, even though their behaviors were 
often destructive. Allied Signal began to seek out talented personnel who could also work with 
other people. Finally, missing “the numbers” (i.e., cost and schedule) had become a more or less 
accepted practice at Allied Signal. Bossidy made it clear that “the organization would be known 
for meeting commitments. Period.”   
The guiding coalition must identify those cultural features that are valuable and that must endure 
throughout transformation, while shedding traits that have become detrimental. Back to the 
example of Siemens engineers, CEO Von Pierer realized that a culture of innovation was always 
a Siemens advantage, and was therefore a positive legacy that must be maintained. Thus, by 
striking a balance between innovation and customer focus, Siemens was able to deliver 
innovations that were relevant to customer needs. Since transformation involves preserving some 
elements of the status quo and discarding others, leadership must explicitly state what will stay 
and what will go, to avoid confusion.35 
4.4.5 Organizational Design 
Organizations might need to alter their fundamental structure to meet their strategic goals. Yet, 
as was the case with Lockheed Martin Aeronautics, they will likely find few tools to guide 
organizational design.36 Lockheed Martin Aeronautics was formed from three formerly 
independent Lockheed Martin companies via an organizational design process that was 
established in-house.  To capitalize on familiar concepts, leadership structured the organizational 
design process to emulate aircraft design wherein the individual business-areas or processes were 
analogous to aircraft sub-systems. The organizational design was broken into the following three 
phases, each culminating with a review:  
• System Requirements Review (SRR): Use the strategic vision to define what future 
business-areas are needed. 
• Preliminary Design Review (PDR): Illustrate top-level organizational design and define 
the roles and responsibilities of the leadership of the new business-areas. 
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• Critical Design Review (CDR): Provide a plan to begin operation of the new 
organizations. Identify any remaining issues and plan for their resolution. 
Execution was tied to concrete yearly objectives that had been established in the strategic 
planning. For example, during its first year of transformation, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 
established the following goals: 
• In the first three months, top Lockheed Martin Aeronautics leadership would be in place. 
• By the end of the year, the new organizational designs would be complete and the next 
three levels of management would be in place. 
The transformation leadership team supported organizational design by ensuring that corporate 
perspectives (e.g., HR and personnel issues) were addressed in a consistent manner. Optimal 
integration of the individual organizations (“sub-systems”) into the transformed Lockheed 
Martin Aeronautics (the “full system”) was ensured via an organizational integration design 
team. 
4.4.6 Short-Term Wins and Intermediate Phases 
Transformations can be expected to take about three to five years, but work must proceed 
quickly. Rogers contends that the private equity firm experience shows that focusing on the 
medium-term (3-5 years) strikes an optimal balance between avoiding counter-productive short-
term decisions and maintaining a sense of urgency in transforming the business.37 Not 
surprisingly, most transformations that we observed in this study were in the three to five year 
range. Since momentum loss can sap transformation energy and focus, Lockheed Martin’s 
Augustine exhorts transformation leaders to announce an ambitious schedule and keep to it.38 
Transformation leaders must plan and ensure that tangible transformation milestones (“short-
term wins”) are met within a year or so. Kotter’s research shows that people will lose faith if 
they do not see tangible gains within the first year or two of transformation. As such, pre-planned 
short-term wins are an essential ingredient to a successful transformation effort. Kotter suggests 
that the wins be designed to be unambiguous, and not a judgment call that can be discounted by 
detractors. The short-term wins should fall directly out of the Strategy Map or should be apparent 
from whatever plan the organization has developed. For example, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 
used Kaizen events to reduce assembly time, rework, and scrap on the Joint Strike Fighter 
production line.39  
Although short-term wins are essential, declaring victory too soon can be disastrous. Kotter 
reports that transformations often fail simply because the temptation to declare success after a 
few short-term wins overcomes the need to maintain focus and intensity on the transformation 
effort. Thus, declaring victory too soon ushers in a return to complacency. Instead of declaring 
victory, Kotter recommends that the guiding coalition use the credibility gained through short-
term wins to tackle more complex problems. Finally, even when the effort is ultimately 
successful, the organization must characterize and communicate that success and prevent erosion 
of its gains through continuous improvement. 
4.4.7 Vetting the Plan 
The best laid strategies will amount to nothing if they are not effectively executed. Ensuring 
effective execution entails worrying about details that seem trivial by comparison to strategic 
planning. Yet, Rouse reminds us that it is through these details that the plan will either come to 
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fruition, or fail. It is in execution that the detail-oriented personnel come to the fore. These 
personnel must understand the “who, what, how, when, and why.”§ Specifically,  
• Who will execute the various tasks? 
• What tasks will be accomplished and what resources are needed? 
• How will the tasks be accomplished, and are the necessary resources available? 
• When will the tasks be completed? 
• Why are particular actions being undertaken? 
4.4.8 Consensus and Obstacles 
Kotter’s research shows that ongoing vigilance to identify and remove obstacles is essential to 
transformation success. Obstacles can be personnel who feel threatened and undermine 
transformation by words and / or deeds (with the resultant damage increasing with the rank of the 
oppositional individual). Alternatively, obstacles can be existing organizational practices that do 
not serve the vision. One interviewee noted that, once the vision has been identified, the guiding 
coalition should “shred” anyone who does not support the vision. Similarly, Bossidy contends 
that people must either change or “walk the plank.”40 Given that a key function of the 
transformation champions is to encourage employees to maintain a sense of urgency and to make 
sacrifices, the guiding coalition must resolutely remove obstacles if it is to maintain its 
credibility. 
The transformation leadership must be able to distinguish organizational obstacles from 
constructive critics. Rouse contends that the quest for unanimous agreement often causes 
differing viewpoints to be buried. Constructive criticisms or misgivings can provide valuable 
insights into a plan’s flaws. But if criticism is completely quashed, it cannot benefit the 
organization. Frank critique and peer review, by individuals who are committed to improving the 
organization, will ultimately yield a more comprehensive and successful product. The 
aforementioned Ford PM/EI approach is an avenue for eliciting constructive criticism. 
4.4.9 Missteps 
Leadership should be undaunted by the fact that, in the course of transformation, mistakes will 
be made. Lockheed Martin Aeronautics leadership acknowledges that the speed with which they 
approached transformation led to some missteps.41 Nevertheless, they contend that these 
missteps were preferable to the loss of urgency and focus that would inevitably have 
accompanied a slower and more methodical approach. Furthermore, the LM leadership is 
confident that they have been (and will continue to be) able to correct any errors. 
 
                                                 
§ Rouse’s points are virtually identical to Ford Motor Company’s 5W-2H checklist (Who, What, Where, When, 
Why, How, and How much). 
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5. METRICS – WHAT GETS MEASURED GETS DONE 
We have left the discussion of metrics to the end of the transformation process because, as seen 
above, metrics are used throughout. Pall’s metrics can be used to quantify crisis drivers. The 
balanced Scorecard and Strategy Map provide a host of strategic planning metrics. Finally, in the 
execution phase, the well proven productivity improvement methodologies such as Lean or TQM 
rely on process related metrics (time, cost, defects) to drive improvements.  
The choice of metrics is application specific. Managers in private equity firms are careful to 
avoid imposing one set of measures across their entire portfolios, preferring to tailor measures to 
each business they hold. "You have to use performance measures that make sense for the 
business unit itself rather than some preconceived notion from the corporate center." 42 Powers 
stresses that metrics should tie to an organization’s key processes and products. This tie-in is 
achieved in the planning phase by using rigorous planning tools and in the execution phase by 
productivity improvement tools. Finally, metrics must be chosen carefully to ensure that they do 
not work against one another, as was the case in the earlier example of the bottle-making 
company.  
Organizations often seek leading indicators to forecast their state of health rather than relying on 
lagging indictors that are useful only after the fact. Nevertheless, accurate leading indicators 
have proven difficult to find.  A compromise approach is to use metrics associated with tactical 
activities that support a longer term strategic goal as quasi-leading indicators. For example, an 
organization might have a strategic goal to be number one in its product area. To attain the 
strategic goal, the organization might set a variety of tactical goals such as productivity 
improvement in their production processes. The organization will only know whether they have 
attained their productivity goals after they have retooled their process (a lagging indicator). 
Nevertheless, once the productivity goal is attained, it is an indicator that the organization is on 
its way to achieving its strategic goal (a leading indicator). Thus, although metrics associated 
with these tactical activities are lagging indicators, they are leading indicators with regard to 
attaining the strategy. 
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6. CONCLUSION – A CAUTION AND A CHALLENGE 
We close with a caution and a challenge. Transformation has many elements, and failure of any 
one can doom the entire process. Research shows that most transformations fall short of their 
desired goals, with many failing outright. Thus, if confronted with the need to transform, the 
organization and its leadership must be steeled for an arduous process that has bested many 
capable people and worthy organizations. As such, successfully transforming, and thereby 
maintaining relevance and securing continued existence, is one of the highest challenges to 
which an organization and its leadership can aspire.  
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APPENDIX A:  STRATEGIC PLANNING USING THE STRATEGY MAP 
We have selected Kaplan’s Balanced Scorecard and Strategy Map and as the basis for our 
discussion of strategy development.43, 44  Rouse explains that planning to get from the present to 
the future is a design task that should yield a map showing how and when people’s work 
activities will transition.45 Yet, Rouse does not provide approaches to develop such a map. The 
Balanced Scorecard / Strategy Map methodology explicitly links transformation activities to 
desired outcomes. Notably, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics EVP Tom Burbage endorsed the 
balanced scorecard.46  
Kaplan’s balanced scorecard identifies the following four strategic elements that support 
planning transformation strategy:**  
• customer value 
• financial  
• internal process  
• learning and growth.  
Kaplan summarizes by stating “the Balanced Scorecards tell you the knowledge, skills, and 
systems that your employees will need (their learning and growth) to innovate and build the right 
strategic capabilities and efficiencies (the internal processes) that deliver specific value to the 
market (the customers), which will eventually lead to higher shareholder value (the financials).”  
The balanced scorecard metrics are used in developing a Strategy Map which identifies 
organizational goals to address the crisis. The Strategy Map links the categories on the balanced 
scorecard in a cause-and-effect chain that connects desired outcomes to driving activities.  
We will demonstrate strategy mapping using the example of an organization that produces 
power-generating equipment. The organization’s competitors are able to produce products with 
comparable capabilities, but at a lower cost. The organization is facing a crisis due to shrinking 
revenues.  
High-Level Plan 
Developing a Strategy Map starts with articulating a succinct, high-level plan to address the 
crisis. The plan must consider the internal and external crisis drivers identified earlier during 
crisis characterization (customer impact, worth, relevance, and viability). Powers cautions that 
careful consideration must be given to what the plan says.47 The plan must not be just 
“motherhood and apple pie” slogans. The plan must be challenging and uniquely applicable to 
the organization. An exemplary plan was “put a man on the moon by the end of the decade.” 
Writing on the success of private equity firms, Rogers suggests a brief, qualitative plan such as, 
“return the company’s focus to its core business of X.” 48 GE articulated a plan to “Be number 
one or two in all business-areas. Fix, close, or sell businesses that are not.” 
A poorly considered plan can impede transformation and harm the organization. Xerox 
articulated a plan to “be the fiber optic company.” In so doing, they deemed the still-necessary 
                                                 
** Clearly, Kaplan’s and Pall’s metrics are quite similar, which allows using consistent metrics in both characterizing 
and addressing the crisis. 
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electronics organizations to be a thing of the past, pitting them against the optical organizations. 
In contrast, a later Xerox slogan, “the document company,” focused efforts and was more 
successful. 
Our example organization decides that it will address its crisis by bringing more innovative 
products to the market. The organization articulates a plan to “Be the innovation leader in power 
generation.”  
Customer Value Proposition 
The plan must be supported by a customer value proposition. Kaplan points out that most 
organizations should strive to excel in one of three possible customer value propositions 
(operational excellence, customer intimacy, or product leadership) and maintain threshold 
performance in the other two. Operational excellence stresses high quality, competitive pricing, 
and on-time delivery. Customer intimacy stresses personalized service and long-term customer 
relations. Product leadership stresses innovative products that push the capability envelope. 
Choice of a customer value proposition will derive from an understanding of customer needs, 
which should have become apparent during crisis characterization (ideally, customers will have 
direct input into this choice).  
A product leadership customer value proposition will support our example organization’s goal of 
being the innovation leader.  
Financial Strategy 
The organization must establish a financial strategy to support its customer value proposition. 
There are two primary tools to use in developing a financial strategy: revenue growth and 
productivity increases. Revenue can be grown by expanding the customer base (which is the 
number of customers who buy the product) and / or by increasing product value (which allows 
the products to be sold for a higher cost that is commensurate with the product’s superior 
capabilities). Productivity can be grown through improving operating costs and / or asset 
utilization. The financial strategy utilizes some combination of these two tools.  
Our example organization elects to pursue a revenue growth financial strategy whereby they 
increase product value through innovation. The higher value products should command higher 
market prices and thereby increase revenue to the organization. 
Internal Processes 
The organization then identifies what internal processes are needed to support the financial 
strategy. For example, an operational excellence value proposition would be enabled by process 
improvement, asset optimization, and supply chain management. Customer intimacy would be 
enabled by partnering with customers to better understand their needs, and training personnel to 
improve their customer service skills. Product leadership would be enabled by a vigorous R&D 
effort.  
Accordingly, in our example, the organization bolsters its R&D capabilities to foster value-
adding innovation. In addition the organization establishes customer liaison processes to 
strengthen the tie between R&D and customer needs. Finally, the organization enhances its 
design and production capabilities to allow rapid prototyping that facilitates getting new products 
to the market more quickly.  
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Learning and Growth 
For the learning and growth element, the company must identify the core competencies, 
technologies, policies, and cultural aspects that best support the internal process enablers listed 
above.  
Our example company strives to develop an “out-of-the-box culture” to foster innovative 
thinking. The company hires greater numbers of research oriented personnel. The company also 
encourages technical risk-taking to push the envelope of its products and increases funding for 
long-term / high- payoff research. The company strives to foster greater customer focus that 
keeps R&D tied to addressing customer desires. To this end, the company identifies technical 
personnel with good interpersonal skills and trains them to interact more effectively with 
customers, so that customer desires can be used to guide R&D efforts 
Figure 1 shows a diagram of the Strategy Map, with the elements selected for our example 
organization highlighted. 
 
Figure 1  Example Strategy Map for the Power Generating Equipment Company
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